The uncertainty about the actual number of Egyptian Christians adds to the malaise that the debate about national identity fuels amongst them.

An overestimate of the Coptic population often goes hand in hand with a sort of ethno-nationalism that rejects the "Arabness" of the Egyptian Christians, the latter being considered more authentically "Egyptian" than the country's Muslims.

In reality, the issue of the Coptic population's weight would be less thorny if citizenship were defined in terms of rights and duties.

In this extremely delicate moment of political and social transition while the debate about Egypt's identity is raging, however, the question of numbers becomes vital.

In any case, the Copts are unquestionably the most substantial Christian community in the Arab world today.

Less hit by the emigration phenomenon (2) than the other Christians in the Near East (at least until recently), the Copts constitute Christianity's most vital force and a presence that is decisive for its survival in the region that saw its birth.

Islamic identity and Coptic sub-citizenship

From the beginning of the 1970s onwards, Islamist rhetoric has taken advantage of the persisting poverty and inequalities in Egypt (aggravated by a predatory and dictatorial regime) to denounce the failure of imported models and call for an integral application of Islam's principles as the only road to national salvation. Islamist action has become manifest, in particular, in repeated acts of violence against the Copts. Continue reading

Sources

• MercatorNet, from an article by Christian Cannuyer, from the Catholic University of Louvain
• Image: Tampa Bay Times

Having crushed his internal opponents in May 1971, Sadat faced the overwhelming challenge of trying to find a way out of the predicament Egypt was in after its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967. After some hesitation, he finally moved forward by launching an attack on Israel on 6 October 1973. The initial success of the Egyptian war effort gave the country a new sense of pride and its leader a much needed legitimacy.

While the Egyptian regime maintained its verbal commitment to Nasser's socialist policies, the reality was a state bureaucracy and services network that had lost all ability to deliver due to population growth. The state's withdrawal from its active duty meant the rise of alternative networks to provide for the needy in the fields of education, health and financial assistance. Inevitably what filled the gap left by the state were religious institutions. Both the church and the rising Islamists witnessed a wide expansion of their activities, ultimately replacing the state in providing for the people.

Sadat was no friend of democracy, but nonetheless he undertook opening up the political sphere. The one-party system was abolished and political parties were allowed. But ultimately, his most important domestic decision, a decision that would eventually cost him his life, was the freedom he gave to the formation of Islamist groups. In order to counter the prevailing Nasserist and leftist domination of university campuses, Sadat allowed, and in some cases encouraged, the growth of Islamist currents on campuses and eventually beyond. More religious and conservative than his predecessor, Sadat did not realize until it was too late that he had unleashed a storm that would destroy him.

Copts under threat

Under Sadat, religion was increasingly replacing nationalism as the foundation of the country; Christianity was ridiculed daily in the press. It was only inevitable that this would alienate Copts, who were increasingly fearful for their future. On university campuses, Islamist groups began targeting Christian students. Clashes soon took place. More violence became only a matter of time.

The focal point of some attacks was buildings that Christians used for prayer and that had not obtained the necessary government approval. On 6 November 1972, an attack took place in El Khanka on such a building. Angered, the recently enthroned Pope Shenouda III (r. 1971-2012) ordered some bishops and priests to march to the place and hold Mass. Such a march was viewed as a provocation by Muslims, and the building was attacked again. The parliamentary committee tasked with investigating the attack noted that out of 1,442 church buildings in Egypt only 500 had the necessary governmental approval. It also noted that in the ten-year period from 1962 to 1972, 127 permits were given to church buildings and that only 68 of these were for the Coptic Church. These 68 included only 22 new and 46 renovation permits. The committee recommended a government solution to the problem, but none was undertaken. Continue reading

Sources

• ABC Religion and Ethics
• Image: Front Page Mag